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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940245-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for fraudulent offer 
or sale of securities, a felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1; offer or sale of unregistered securities, a felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7; and offer or sale of 
securities by an unregistered agent, a felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ, : Case No. 940245-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2) (f) , whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court misinterpret the securities law penalty 
provision, which excludes a term of imprisonment for offenders who 
have no knowledge of the (violated) rule or order, by erroneously 
sentencing Mr. Boaz to a term of imprisonment when his plea only 
established a willful, but unknowledgeable, offense? 
"When examining a trial court's interpretation of a 
statutory provision we apply a correction of error standard." State 
v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial 
courts do not have discretion to misapply the law"); State v. 
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted) 
(appellate courts "will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial 
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial 
judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the 
sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law"). 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
Utah law recently defined the term, "willful", for purposes 
of the securities law provisions. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1993). Case law has not analyzed, however, whether the 
punishment of imprisonment must always apply to willful securities 
law offenders. Under the plain language of the securities law 
penalty statute, persons who act willfully, but with "no knowledge of 
the (violated) rule or order", are the lone class of offenders not 
subject to imprisonment albeit other punishments apply. An opinion 
is needed to clarify the issue. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
fraudulent offer or sale of securities, a felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1; offer or sale of unregistered securities, a 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7; and offer or sale 
of securities by an unregistered agent, a felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1). See (R 463-73; 579). On February 11, 
1994, Mr. Robert Harold Boaz entered a conditional guilty plea to 
the above offenses, reserving his right to appeal various issues.1 
On March 21, 1994, following a waiver of the time required 
for sentencing, the court sentenced "Mr. Boaz to zero to three years 
in the Utah State Prison on each of the three charges that he pled 
to[,]M with the terms imposed consecutively. (R 609); £f_. infra 
note 6. The prison terms were stayed, however, in favor of a 36 
month period of probation. (R 609-11). 
Terms and conditions of probation included 6 months in the 
Salt Lake County jail with credit given for 14 days served; a 
1. As part of Mr. Boaz's plea agreement, "the state and 
the Court agree that defendant does not waive his right to appeal 
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss filed for Lack of Jurisdiction, 
and accompanying documents and arguments in support thereof, but 
rather enters pleas conditionally preserving that right of 
appeal . . . " (R 461). Following a motion, stipulation, and order 
from this Court, Mr. Boaz reasserted his jurisdictional arguments in 
a supplemental brief. Mr. Boaz's jurisdictional arguments were 
advanced personally by him, in propria persona. See, e.g., 
(R 201-96) . The nonjurisdictional arguments herein do not 
constitute a waiver of jurisdiction but are done pursuant to the 
representations made below to the court and in the docketing 
statement. See (R 545) & Motion filed February 6, 1995. 
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restitution order of $12,000 to Kirk Newman and $5,000 to George 
Birch (with a hearing provided for in the event of a dispute); 200 
hours of community service (monitored by AP&P); and a $250 
recoupment fee to the Legal Defender Association. (R 609-10) . 
Pursuant to the parties' statements in the plea agreement, the court 
stayed the actual execution of its sentence pending disposition of 
Mr. Boaz's case on appeal. (R 611). 
STATEMENT OF THE, FACTS 
The facts relevant to the sentencing order are alluded to 
above, but were more specifically addressed at sentencing: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . We would assert that 
Mr. Boaz would qualify for the treatment of Utah Code 
Section 61-1-21 wherein no person may be imprisoned 
for the violation of any rule or order if he proves 
that he has no knowledge of the rule or order. Simply 
because Mr. Boaz entered a plea of guilty to the 
charges, does not inherently mean that he was 
admitting that was was aware of the rules. As we have 
discussed extensively during the plea, as well as the 
Court is aware of the willful standards, willful 
standards as defined by C. Dean Larsen, which is just 
the desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result. Mr. Boaz pleaded guilty because there was a 
scienter element. He never admitted he intended to 
defraud anybody or he intended to violate any rules or 
statutes. On the contrary, he has insisted he was 
unaware of it, his conduct was violative of any rule. 
He is not educated in this area. He had no knowledge 
of the intricacies of securities law but based upon 
the willful standards and lack of scienter, he did 
enter his plea. We'd ask the Court to consider any 
form of incarceration inappropriate and the statute 
takes into consideration that there are individuals 
who will fall within the purview of violating the 
securities laws, but would not fall due to their lack 
of expertise or knowledge or scienter, if you will, 
would not fall within the punitive sanction of 
incarceration. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, [counsel]. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I suppose in sum our 
position would be this Court ought not to impose jail 
time with Mr. Boaz at all. There are other forms of 
punishment that this Court could take that would be as 
effective to Mr. Boaz. It should be noted that he's 
served 12 days in jail [sic] at this point on this 
matter; that for someone in his situation, with the 
kind of background he has, where he has actually been 
involved in chaplaincies, if you will, and been into 
prisons before and then [found] himself in this 
situation. Under the circumstances, . . . [it] has 
been a punishment in and of itself. It has been quite 
a bit of embarrassment in his own community with 
individuals. I believe the recommendation for jail is 
inappropriate. 
The other recommendations, I believe, would 
accordingly be appropriate.... 
(R 599-601). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The securities law penalty provision punishes willful and 
knowledgeable violators with fines and/or imprisonment. "Willful" 
has been defined by statute and in a securities law decision as the 
"desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result". Under that 
narrow definition, Mr. Boaz's plea merely established a "willful" 
but unknowing violation. By statute, a willful but unknowing 
violation is less punishable than a willful and knowledgeable 
violation. The former prohibits imprisonment while the latter does 
not. Because Mr. Boaz falls under the willful but unknowledgeable 
situation, the court's order of imprisonment should be vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
PUNISHMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS COMMITTED WILLFULLY BUT 
WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE VIOLATED RULE OR ORDER MAY 
NOT INCLUDE A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT 
Under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, an Act in and of 
itself, the penalty provision for securities violations contains a 
clause without a counterpart in the criminal code. Section 61-1-21 
of the Securities Act prohibits the penalty of imprisonment if a 
defendant establishes that he had no knowledge of the rule or order 
which had in fact been violated: 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of 
this chapter except Section 61-1-16, or who willfully 
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who 
willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the 
statement made to be false or misleading in any 
material respect, shall upon conviction be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three 
years, or both. No person may be imprisoned for the 
violation of any rule or order if he proves that he 
had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment 
or information may be returned or complaint filed 
under this chapter more than five years after the 
alleged violation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1988) (emphasis added)2; cj£. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-3-203; 76-3-301. 
Mr. Boaz acknowledges the three year period of imprisonment 
penalty, but, because of the accompanying (underscored) clause, the 
2. The 1988 version of 61-1-21, quoted above, has since 
been modified although the language of the underscored clause has 
remained the same. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1988), with 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (Supp. 1994). The 1988 version applies 
here because of the date of the offense, a fact duly noted by both 
parties. See generally (R 461-71). Unless otherwise indicated, all 
statutory references are from 1988 (amendments since 1988, if any, 
would not alter the analysis). 
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penalty of imprisonment would be inapplicable to his unknowing 
violation. 
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, this 
court first examines the plain language of the statute." State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). While the plain language here 
allows for imprisonment, the very next statutory clause prohibits a 
term of imprisonment if there is "no knowledge of the rule or 
order." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. The "imprisonment" language 
initially stated should not be read in isolation. See Utah State 
Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984) ("terms of the 
related code provision should be construed in a harmonious fashion"); 
M. Silver v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 820 P.2d 912, 
914 (Utah 1991) ("In construing the statute, we follow the rule that 
the terms of a statute should not be interpreted in a piecemeal 
fashion, but as a whole"). 
Importantly, the accompanying "no imprisonment" prohibition 
does not dispense with punishment altogether nor does it preclude 
the imposition of fines. Rather, incarceration is the only 
punishment listed which may be avoided. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21; 
accord (R 601) (appointed counsel for Mr. Boaz conceded that 
punishments other than imprisonment "would accordingly be 
appropriate"). 
The legislature's decision to include "imprisonment" and 
"no imprisonment" text in the same penalty statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-21, together with recent case law on the meaning of 
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"willful", State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993), reveals that 
a securities violation committed willfully may not necessarily have 
been also committed with "knowledge of the rule or order". 
Otherwise, if no distinction existed between the willful requirement 
and such knowledge, the "no knowledge of the rule or order" clause 
would be rendered superfluous. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. By 
statute, a willful violation does not have to include a term of 
imprisonment, id., and a willful violation may occur without 
"knowledge of the rule or order." Id. 
In Larsen, a securities fraud case involving provisions 
similar to the ones involved here, defendant Larsen asked the "court 
to interpret 'willfully' as requiring 'scienter,' the intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud, . . . " Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 
(citation omitted). Finding a lack of support in the plain language 
of the statute, the supreme court rejected Larsen's arguments. "If 
the legislature had wanted scienter for perceived public policy 
reasons, it could have included that requirement. It did not, and 
we will not." _Id. at 1360. The court refused "to engraft a 
judicially created intent requirement upon the plain language of a 
criminal statute." Jd. at 1358.3 
According to the court: "An individual must act willfully 
to be criminally liable under the statute. This means that the 
3. Defendant Larsen's claimed parallels to federal law 
were unpersuasive because "he fails to recognize that the Utah 
legislature has not required the courts to interpret the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act in lockstep with federal decisions." Larsen, 
865 P.2d at 1360. 
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prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
'desire [d] to engage in the conduct or cause[d] the result.'" Id. 
at 1360 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103). The court's willful 
definition is consistent with the penalty provision of the 
securities act in that a violation may have been committed willfully 
(i.e. through a desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result), but that the violation need not also have been committed 
with "knowledge of the rule or the order." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. 
In essence, such knowledge under the securities fraud 
penalty statute includes three different scenarios. One, a person 
has knowledge of the rule or order and commits no wrongdoing. No 
penalty applies. 
Two, a person has knowledge of the rule or order and 
willfully commits a violation. Such a violator "desire[s] to engage 
in the conduct or cause [s] the result" and the violator does so 
while cognizant of the applicable (violated) rule or order. 
Imprisonment is appropriate for such a willful and knowledgeable 
violation. A fine also may apply. Id. 
And three, a person has no knowledge of the rule or order, 
but willfully commits a violation in the manner defined by our 
supreme court. 865 P.2d at 1360. A person who acts willfully but 
without knowledge of the rule or order is less culpable than a 
person in the second situation. The less culpable offender still 
remains subject to punishment, however, albeit the penalty of 
imprisonment does not apply. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Mr. Boaz 
falls under the last example. 
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During the entry of plea proceedings, held on February 11, 
1994, Mr. Boaz's plea included a "willful" violation but only as 
that term was defined by the Larsen case.4 (R 574-75) . 
4. During the plea proceedings, after the court recounted 
the factual basis for the involved offense, Mr. Boaz's willful 
acknowledgment was clarified for the court: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, just for clarification as 
we discussed under the C. Dean Larsen opinion of willful 
and the way that term is defined. Mr. Boaz would admit 
that he acted willfully, not that he acted with any 
scienter or any intent to defraud. He is not admitting 
that. 
THE COURT: Have you had a discussion with Mr. Boaz 
regarding, you probably have, the distinction between 
"willful" in terms of an intent to defraud versus "willful" 
being defined as the desire to engage in the conduct itself? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We have. . . . In fact, also as we 
entered these negotiations we received from the state a 
comment which I think was most helpful in encouraging 
Mr. Boaz to accept this. That is, [the State] indicated to 
us to remind Mr. Boaz this count 4 that deals in fraud is 
not the common law fraud that we are often hearing about 
and talking about, but a securities fraud situation as 
alleged which has the willfulness to something other than, 
I suppose, the intent element that is commonly referred 
to. I believe that it is that comment and explanation, as 
much as anything, that assisted Mr. Boaz to distinguish 
between what he was being charged with and how the Court 
was interpreting that from the Larsen opinion and prepared 
him to enter this plea today. 
THE COURT: Mr. Boaz, with that amplification, did you 
engage in that conduct willful[ly]? 
MR. BOAZ: Yes, as it has been defined. 
(R 574-75) . The limited nature of the willful standard again was 
emphasized for the other counts and also during the sentencing 
proceedings. (R 576); see supra Statement of Facts (quoting 
[R 599-601]). 
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Acknowledging nothing more than "willful" acts (i.e. "the desire to 
engage in the conduct itself"), Mr. Boaz's representations 
established "no knowledge of the rule or order". (R 575). 
Consequently, even though such willful conduct subjected him to 
punishment, the penalties listed by statute may not include 
imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. 
M. Silver v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 82 0 
P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991), lends analogous support. In Silver, the 
defendant appealed a tax penalty on the grounds that his mental 
state (or lack thereof) did not fall under the proscriptions of a 
tax penalty statute. Silver argued that the mandate of the statute, 
which required proof of an "intent to evade", was not satisfied by 
merely acknowledging not "do[ing] that which the law, in fact, may 
require." See id. at 915. "Silver concede[d] that he did not 
intend to file [tax] returns, but that this state of mind was based 
on an understanding, apparently mistaken, that he was not obligated 
to file under state or federal law." Id. at 914. He argued that an 
intent greater than a conscious objective was required before the 
penalty applied. 
On appeal, the supreme court agreed. A person who acts 
intentionally may not necessarily have acted with the intent "to 
avoid a legal requirement with which the actor knows he or she is 
obligated to comply[.]" See id. at 915 (emphasis added). A willful 
violation, standing alone, was not enough to invoke the involved 
penalty. But see id. at 916 ("It may be that Silver is liable for 
some other, lesser penalty, a point we do not address[.]"). 
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The principles in Silver apply equally to the case at bar.5 
In both cases, there is an acknowledged "conscious objective or 
desire to accomplish the prohibited end." Compare 820 P.2d at 914 
("Silver concedes that he did not intend to file returns"), with 
(R 600) (Mr. Boaz's act or omission was "just the desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result"). For the involved penalty to 
apply, in both cases "it is not sufficient that the actor merely 
intends not to do that which the law, in fact, may require." 
Silver, 820 P.2d at 915 (emphasis added) (the $1,000 tax penalty is 
inapplicable if a willful violator does not also evade legal 
requirements with which he "knows he . . . is obligated to comply"); 
5. The main thrust of the court's analysis in Silver is 
reprinted below: 
[The tax penalty statute] requires that one have an "intent 
to evade" a tax or legal requirement before one is exposed 
to the penalty of up to $1,000 imposed by that section. 
The usual meaning of the term "intent" is that one must 
have a conscious objective or desire to accomplish the 
prohibited end. The object of the required intent under 
[the tax penalty statute] is "to evade" the requirements of 
the tax laws. "Evade" is defined as avoidance of something 
by effort, skill, dexterity, contrivance, subterfuge, 
ingenuity, or artifice. We read the term "intent to 
evade," then, to require a conscious desire to avoid a 
legal requirement with which the actor knows he or she is 
obligated to comply; it is not sufficient that the actor 
merely intends not to do that which the law, in fact, may 
require. In short, an intent not to file a tax return, 
even though required to law to file, is an "intent to 
evade" only if the actor is aware that he or she is legally 
required to file. 
M. Silver v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 820 P.2d 912, 915 
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
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cf. (R 599-601) (emphasis added) (the securities law penalty of 
imprisonment is inapplicable if a willful violator does not also act 
with "knowledge of the [violated] rule or order"). Although other 
penalties potentially apply, the punishment appealed should not be 
allowed. Compare Silver, 820 P.2d at 916 ($1,000 tax penalty was 
disallowed), with (R 599-601) (order of imprisonment should be 
disallowed). 
The "no knowledge" provision barring imprisonment is a 
securities law penalty limitation unlike anything contained in the 
punishment section of the criminal code. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-21, with Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(5)(a); 76-3-203; 
76-3-301. If the legislature had intended for the imprisonment 
penalties statutes to all be the same, it would have done so. See 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360 ("It did not, and we will not"). 
Under the minimum mandatory statutes, for instance, the 
sentences range in terms of high, medium, or low severity. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(5) (a) . Yet, even when persuaded by a showing 
of mitigating circumstances (a clause marginally similar in function 
to the "no knowledge" securities provision), the court's minimum 
sentence still must include a term of imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(5) (d) . Unlike under the securities provision, a "no 
knowledge" showing for minimum mandatory crimes would not provide a 
basis for avoiding incarceration. 
Under the criminal code indeterminate sentencing statutes, 
varying terms of imprisonment are set forth, but there is no 
accompanying provision prohibiting imprisonment if persons show no 
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"knowledge of the rule or order." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(3) . Imprisonment may be stayed or avoided through other 
means, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (probation), although no provision 
provides the opportunity afforded by the "no knowledge" securities 
clause. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. 
At best, once a court imposes imprisonment for an 
indeterminate offense,6 the Parole Board may later rely on a "no 
knowledge" showing in order to shorten further periods of 
incarceration. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (if so persuaded, 
the Board may exercise its discretion and discharge the inmate). 
The court itself, however, is not bound statutorily once such 
knowledge is presented under the criminal code indeterminate 
sentencing scheme. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203. Limitations on 
incarceration are only provided by the securities law penalty 
provision. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. 
In fact, the "no knowledge" securities provision leaves the 
court with no choice in the matter. Imprisonment is simply not a 
6. The third degree felony section of the indeterminate 
sentencing statute provides "for a term not to exceed five years", 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3), although the bar and bench have both 
typically referred to the term as "zero-to-five years". See 
(R 609). More precisely, however, the statutory language requires a 
felon to "be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
. . . [not to exceed five years.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203; see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (terms for "not more than three years" 
are provided for). In other words, at least one day of the prison 
term must be served before the Parole Board is theoretically 
empowered to release him. In any event, if "a term not to exceed 
five years" is imposed, there is no accompanying provision 
completely prohibiting imprisonment in the manner provided by the 
"no knowledge" securities statute. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(3), with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. 
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viable securities law sentencing alternative if "no knowledge" is 
shown. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. By comparison, the court's power 
under the criminal code indeterminate sentencing scheme is more 
discretionary. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201; 76-3-203. Imprisonment 
may or may not be appropriate, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c), with 
the ultimate determination depending on considerations other than 
the securities "no knowledge" provision. 
In short,7 the "no knowledge" clause of the securities 
penalty section provides the exception to the general rule of 
imprisonment under the criminal code. If the legislature did not 
want a "no knowledge" showing to be a securities law limitation on 
the sentence of imprisonment, it would have omitted such limiting 
language from its provision. The plain language of the securities 
law penalty provision should be followed. 
7. Mr. Boaz does not ignore the long standing principle 
that ignorance of the law is no excuse. See Smith v. Morris, 690 
P.2d 560 (Utah 1984); (R 602). This codified principle, however, is 
entirely consistent with the legislature's drafting of the "no 
knowledge" securities statute. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304, 
with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. 
The securities provision (which contains "penalties" in its 
title) pertains to the sentencing context. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-21. The text specifically refers to fines and terms of 
imprisonment (if applicable). Id. "Upon conviction", securities 
violators are subject to its provisions. _Id. By contrast, the 
"ignorance of law" provision refers to (in)applicable defenses to 
crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304. Limitations to a court's 
sentence are not at issue, c£. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21; rather, the 
"ignorance" focus is on whether it serves as a defense to "any 
prosecution" of a crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Boaz respectfully requests this Court to vacate the 
lower court's sentencing order of incarceration. Punishments other 
than imprisonment may have been appropriately imposed below, but the 
court's order of imprisonment violates the limitations contained in 
the securities penalty statute. 
SUBMITTED this **-l day of February, 1995. 
NAID" 
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ADDENDUM A 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
?*£Uf J™* n e c e s s a r y i n <>r<fer to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading- or 
(3 engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person 
61-1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and invest-
ment advisers. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as a 
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter. 
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an 
agent unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective 
during any period when he is not associated with a particular broker-
dealer licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer. 
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection with a broker-
dealer or issuer, or begins or terminates those activities which make him 
an agent, the agent as well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly 
notify the division. 
61-1-7. Registration before sale. 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless 
it is registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted 
under section 61-1-14. 
61-1-21. Penalties for violations — Limitation of prosecu-
tions* 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter except Sec-
tion 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter, or 
who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false 
or misleading in any material respect, shall upon conviction be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. No person 
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves that he 
had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment or information may be 
returned or complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the 
alleged violation. 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge ; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negli-
gence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature 
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objec-
tive or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature ot 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal 
law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reli-
ance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or 
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a 
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a 
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he 
believed. 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with manda-
tory sentences — Resentencing. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unteis otherwise specifically provided by l a w ~ 
(d) to imprisonment; or J ' 
(e) to death. 
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
\c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentenc-
ing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judi-
cial Council. 
76-3-202. Paroled persons — '.termination or aiscnarge 
from sentence — Time served on parole — Discre-
tion of Board of Pardons. 
(1) Every person committed to the state prison to serve an indeterminate 
term and later released on parole shall, upon completion of three years on 
parole outside of confinement and without violation, or in the case of a person 
convicted of violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(l)(e), Section 
76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, 
or 76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those sections, upon completion of 
ten years on parole outside of confinement and without violation, be termi-
nated from his sentence unless the person is earlier terminated by the Board 
of Pardons. Any person who violates the terms of his parole, while serving 
parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons be recommitted to 
prison to serve the portion of the balance of his term as determined by the 
Board of Pardons, but not to exceed the maximum term. 
(2) Any person paroled following a former parole revocation may not be 
discharged from his sentence until either: 
(a) he has served three years on parole outside of confinement and 
without violation, or in the case of a person convicted of violating Section 
76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(l)(e), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 
76-5-402.2, 76-6-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 
76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those sections, ten years on 
parole outside of confinement and without violation; 
(b) his maximum sentence has expired; or 
(c) the Board of Pardons so orders. 
(3) (a) All time served on parole, outside of confinement and without viola-
tion constitutes service of the total sentence but does not preclude the 
requirement of serving a three-year or ten-year, as the case may be, 
parole term outside of confinement and without violation. 
(b) Any time a person spends outside of confinement after commission 
of a parole violation does not constitute service of the total sentence un-
less the person is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the parole. 
(c) Any time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing before the Board 
of Pardons or a decision by the board concerning revocation of parole 
constitutes service of the sentence. In the case of exoneration by the 
board, the time spent shall be included in computing the total parole 
term. 
(4) When any parolee without authority from the Board of Pardons absents 
himself from the state or avoids or evades parole supervision, the period of 
absence, avoidance, or* evasion tolls the parole period. 
(5) This section does not preclude the Board of Pardons from paroling or 
discharging an inmate at any time within the discretion of the Board of Par-
dons unless otherwise specifically provided by law. 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
76-3-301. Fines of persons. 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not 
exceeding: 
(a) $10,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the first degree or 
second degree; 
(b) $5,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the third degree; 
(c) $2,500 when the conviction is of a class A misdemeanor; 
(d) $1,000 when the conviction is of a class B misdemeanor; 
(e) $500 when the conviction is of a class C misdemeanor or infraction; 
and 
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute. 
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership, 
government, or governmental instrumentality. 
